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Emotions, Future Selves, and the Process of 
Desistance 
Ben Hunter and Stephen Farrall 
 
ABSTRACT 
Desistance research emphasizes that offenders identify a future self that aids desistance efforts. 
However, it is unclear how future selves operate when offending opportunities arise. To explore this 
we employ qualitative accounts of instances when offenders and ex-offenders abstained from 
RIIHQGLQJDQGWKHHPRWLRQVWKLVHYRNHG2IIHQGLQJZDVDYRLGHGWRSUHVHUYHDVSHFWVRIRIIHQGHUV¶
lives or avoid negative consequences but, for some, avoiding offending brought frustration. Finally, 
those who had made the most progress towards desistance were less likely to identify opportunities 
for offending. These findings suggest future selves inform the desistance process, highlighting 
particular ways to be. However, time is needed to build up valued aspects of the life that may be 
feared lost if engaging in crime. Before the benefits of abstaining are recognized, there may be a 
tension between the future and current self.  
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INTRODUCTION1 
Herein, we explore the relevance of a future, non-offending self for efforts to avoid offending. We 
throw further light on how abstaining from crime µfeels¶. The role of such future selves has been 
highlighted within existing work (Giordano, Cernkovich and Rudolph, 2002; Paternoster and 
Bushway, 2009; Vaughan, 2007). However, identifying how future selves operate at moments when 
individuals could offend but do not has yet to be attempted, leaving an understanding of their 
contribution to desistance underdeveloped. Similarly, the assumption has been that abstaining from 
offending ought to µfeel good¶ for those attempting to desist, providing vital feedback that they are on 
WKHµULJKWSDWK¶LQOHDYLQJFULPHEHKLQGDQGtherefore, that a particular future self is worth pursuing 
(Farrall and Calverley, 2006; Giordano, Schroeder and Cernkovich, 2007). Once again though, we 
have little understanding of how making a commitment to desistance feels.  
Such an understanding is important as part of continuing efforts to explore desistance. Although the 
importance of future selves and emotions for desistance has been argued, a more precise exposition 
of their operation is underdeveloped. We explore these issues through qualitative data, focusing on 
particular moments when individuals could have offended but did not. In order to more clearly situate 
their accounts within a desistance framework, we draw upon a dynamic model of desistance (Farrall 
et al, 2014), locating specific opportunities for offending as part of localized contexts that must be 
negotiated by desisters.  
We proceed by outlining the role of future selves in desistance, noting how a conception of oneself as 
a non-offender assists efforts to refrain from offending. We then consider the role of emotions, noting 
that current conceptualizations of these in desistance suggest that avoiding offending is a pleasant 
experience. We then outline our sample before considering moments when they could have offended 
but abstained. These accounts suggest that while conceptions of future selves are utilised at the 
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moment when offending could occur, the way they are invoked may differ depending on whether or 
not the offender¶s life has progressed to the point that they have µsomething¶2 to lose through further 
offending. Many of our interviewees found abstaining a positive experience. However, several 
reported discomfort at avoiding crime; we concentrate on this group to explore why this might have 
been. We conclude that an important determinant of noticing opportunities ± and therefore employing 
a future, non-offending self ± is the progress that has been made towards desist. Once desistance has 
been established, opportunities to offend may no longer be recognized as such. It would appear that 
ex-offenders no longer spot offending opportunities . The implication of these findings for 
conceptualizations of desistance is discussed.  
 
RECENT THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO DESISTANCE  
As important for the process of desistance as are the various external processes (e.g. life transitions 
WKDW SURYLGH VWUXFWXUH DQG VXSSRUW IRU HIIRUWV WR FKDQJH RI HTXDO LPSRUWDQFH DUH WKH µQDUUDWLYH¶
aspects of desistance (Maruna, 2001). These are the ways the move from offender to ex-offender is 
articulated to form a coherent µOLIH-story¶. Rather than denying they took place or separating them 
from the life now lived, deviant pasts are dealt with through a reconstruction of what they mean, 
potentially to resolve any dissonance presented by a commitment to desistance (Farrall et al, 2014; 
Maruna, 2001; Vaughan, 2007). Reconciling a deviant past with a non-offending future is therefore 
an important part of constructing an identity as an ex-offender. 
For all the importance placed on the past, the future self is an even more vital part of the nascent ex-
offender identity. Lives are lived into the future and the past is interpreted (in part) by who we wish 
to be(come) (Hunter, 2010; 2015; Hunter and Farrall, 2015). A growing body of work has explored 
the future that offenders imagine for themselves, a consistent theme being that desistance is a process 
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that benefits greatly from the conceptualization of a future (non-offending) self (Giordano et al, 2002; 
Healy, 2014; King, 2013; Laws and Ward, 2011; Paternoster and Bushway, 2009; Vaughan, 2007). 
The future is not simply DERXW ³ZKDW , GR´ RU GR Qot do), however. ,W LV DERXW ³ZKR , DP´ or, 
perhaps more accurately, ³who I wiOOEH´, making this an important aspect of attempts to construct an 
identity that will buttress desistance. As Butler suggests (2004:44), when individuals embarking on 
change request recognition it is recognition of their ability to change which they seek. Any future self 
will be quite specific to the individual, but such a self is also likely to be unfinished, uncertain and 
liable to be reworked. Therefore, although offenders may express an indication of whom they wish to 
become, at no point is such a self likely to be fully formed and realised (Hunter and Farrall, 2015). 
Nevertheless, a µEOXH-SULQW¶ RI D non-offending future self assists desistance by providing a goal 
towards which the individual can work (Giordano et al 2002; Hunter, 2010), providing stability and 
coherence to actions (Paternoster, forthcoming). Such a conceptualization assists because images of 
future selves suggest particular ways of thinking and acting in order that behavior aligns with what 
µWKDWVRUWRISHUVRQ¶Zould do. In short, ³SHRSOHFKRRVHKRZHYHUFRQVFLRXVO\RUXQFRQVFLRXVO\ WR
invest in a range of different, often contradictory discursive (and hence historically constituted) 
SRVLWLRQV´*DGGDQG)DUUDOO7KHUHIRUHattempts to theorize how a concern for the future 
informs desistance focus on the ability to envision a particular future self and live a life concomitant 
with this. +RZHYHU ³WKH SURFHVVHV WKURXJK ZKLFK LGHQWLW\ LV FRQVWUXFWHG LV FRQVWDQWO\ IRUPHG
revised, consolidated and (importantly) undermined ± LQUHODWLRQWRRWKHUVUHDODQGLPDJLQHG´*DGG
and Farrall 2004:130) has received scant attention. 
Several theoretical accounts attempt to identify the role of future selves in the desistance process. 
These accounts emphasize the necessity of individuals recognizing the potential of different 
situations in order to act in accordance with longer term, desistance-focused, goals (Giordanoet al; 
Vaughan, 2007). This reflection upon specific situations and the best course of action to take is 
greatly aided by an idea of who one wants to become (Hunter and Farrall, 2015; Paternoster and 
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Bushway, 2009). Not only does an idea of a future (non-offending) self help make offenders aware of 
the possibility of change, thereby inducing a sensitivity to desistance-focused opportunities as they 
occur (Giordanoet al, 2002), it also helps offenders navigate situations in which opportunities to 
offend or to demonstrate that change is taking place present themselves. In this role, the future self 
provides a set of guidelines, steering the actor towards behavior in keeping with their desired self 
(Giordanoet al, 2002; PatHUQRVWHUDQG%XVKZD\7KHQHHGWRLGHQWLI\WKHµGHVLVWDQFH-IULHQGO\¶
route through a particular situation may not be obvious, and the specific nature of a future self may 
shift as desistance progresses (Gadd and Farrall, 2004). Early in the process, deliberation over the 
µcorrect¶ course of action may be explicit, as offenders struggle to overcome entrenched patterns of 
thinking and behavior (Vaughan, 2007). It has also been suggested that, initially, who one wants to 
become is not as powerful a driver of pro-social behavior as who one fears becoming (Paternoster 
and Bushway, 2009). 
The explication of the role of future selves in the desistance process is part of a more general trend 
that aims to outline the role of agency in efforts to desist and construct environments that support 
these efforts (Farrall, 2005; Giordano et al, 2002; and Maruna, 2001). This contrasts with what 
Bushway and Paternoster (2014) identify as the overly-deterministic explanation for desistance given 
by Laub and Sampson (2003),3 whereby offenders encounter institutions or individuals that exert 
social control on them. A more agentic account of desistance has offenders actively seeking 
opportunities and attempting to make the most of them in order to live the lives they wish to, 
particularly with regards to the structural constraints within which offenders live. This is not least 
because, as Maruna (2001:23-24) observes, explaining desistance as a result of rational choice 
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 Laub and Sampson (2003: 9) acknowledge their original (1993) theory lacked an adequate account of agency in the 
desistance process. However, their more recent work has attempted to outline the role of agency vis-à-YLV µH[WHUQDO¶
controls (2005). Nevertheless, the contribution of the work of Bushway, Paternoster and others allows for a more explicit 
understanding of how decisions to desist can pre-empt any meaningful engagement with the social controls traditionally 
associated with desistance from crime. 
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ignores the potentially more interesting question of how such choice operates, particularly in 
situations of extreme disadvantage (Giordanoet al, 2002). 
The above suggests how concerns for the future, who one may become, and who one is trying to 
avoid becoming can influence choices to offend,4 potentially altering the trajectory of a criminal 
career. The difficulty from an empirical point of view, however, is assessing how (and, indeed, 
whether) conceptions of the self actually influence RIIHQGHUV¶ decisions to offend or not at the 
moment they make them. While the above frameworks all usefully conceptualize how future selves 
may impact upon offending, there is little understanding of how any notion of a future self operates 
when individuals are presented with an opportunity to offend. Understanding this will help unpack 
the role of agency in efforts to avoid offending. It is generally agreed that neither human agency nor 
social structures wholly explain routes out of offending (Laub and Sampson, 2003; LeBel et al, 
2008). Instead, the role of agency is likely to be most important when particular opportunities to 
offend are identified, implying recognition of the dilemma facing the individual (i.e. to offend or 
not). ,QYHVWLJDWLQJWKHUROHRIIXWXUHVHOYHVµLQWKHPRPHQW¶LVRQHRIWKHREMHFWLYHV we set ourselves, 
and we return to this after considering another important aspect of desistance from crime: how 
avoiding offending feels.   
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF EMOTIONS IN EFFORTS TO ABSTAIN FROM OFFENDING 
Desistance research has increasingly recognized the emotional aspects of refraining from crime, 
following a more general consideration of crime and emotions (De Haan and Loader, 2002; Karstedt, 
Loader and Strang, 2011). One of our aims is to explore the usefulness of emotions in helping to 
understand efforts to desist. The commitment to a future self is likely to be an uncertain endeavor. 
                                                          
4
 We follow Gadd and Farrall (2004:129) and Weaver and McNeill (2016:103) in recognising that choices can be 
ĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐůǇŽƌƵŶĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐůǇŵŽƚŝǀĂƚĞĚ ?^ŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚǁĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐŽŵĞĂƐ ?ŵĂŬŝŶŐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ? ?ƚŚŝƐĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŝŵƉůǇ
that we assume that these are rational or even given terribly much thought at the time they were made.  
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Future selves are by their nature unfinished constructs, and success in achieving them is far from 
guaranteed (Gadd and Farrall, 2004:139). In committing to a future self, offenders are therefore likely 
to be sensitive to whether attempted FKDQJH LV µZRUNLQJ¶ (Burnett, 2004; +HDO\ DQG 2¶'RQQHOO, 
2008). One source of information in determining this is to acknowledge how attempts to desist µfeel¶, 
making emotions a pivotal source of feedback about both the present and the future. The importance 
of shame in this regard has been attended to (Ahmed et al, 2001; Leibrich, 1996, Scheff, 1994), but 
so too have other feelings; ex-offenders note pride in abstaining from offending, the boost to their 
self-esteem from successfully leaving crime behind and disgust at their previous behaviour (Farrall et 
al, 2014). 
To return to the work on future selves cited above, Giordano et al make little mention of emotions 
within their framework, although they do suggest that identifying the positive aspects of a particular 
future self may make that personmore likely to desist (2002:1041). They also assert that positive 
emotions explain attempts to engage in prosocial behaviour (Giordano, et al, 2007:1614), while, 
feelings such as anger and depression can perpetuate criminality. They further suggest that part of the 
desistance process involves the development of an emotional self, and this can happen independently 
of the sort of life transitions much desistance work has traditionally emphasized (e.g. Laub and 
Sampson, 2003). One way this emotional self develops is that the positive emotions associated with 
criminal activity diminish (Giordano, et al 2007:1624-1626).  
:LWKLQ9DXJKDQ¶VIUDPHZRUNHPRWLRQVRSHUDWHSULRUWRDFWLRQand SURYLGHWKHQHFHVVDU\µVLJQDOV¶DV
to appropriate courses of action via anticipation of how behavior might make one feel (2007:393). 
7KLV³HPRWLRQDOFRPPHQWDU\´:394) is of importance for determining how appropriate a course 
of action is. The assumptionis that anticipating positive feelings as a result of a course of action 
increases the chance it will occur (and indeed, reoccur). For Paternoster and Bushway, the emotional 
work involved in desistance is in part based upon dissatisfaction at offending, the negative possible 
selves that result from its continuation and anticipation of how engagement with more prosocial roles 
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will make one feel (2009:1120). Positive future selves, when envisioned, are sources of esteem, even 
if they do not directly lead to behavior change (2009:1114). Additionally, recognition from others 
WKDWRQHLVµVDYDEOH¶HQDEOHVWKHZRXOG-be desister to start to imagine that a better future is possible 
(Gadd, 2006:193, Farrall, 2005).  
Weaver and McNeill (2015:96), in some ways echoing Gadd (Gadd, 2006, Gadd and Farrall, 2004), 
draw our attention to the role of relationships and desistance beyond marriage (Sampson and Laub, 
1993). Noting that people change in order to sustain relationships they value, they argue that 
relationships motivate people to change behaviour. Additionally, such relationships may enable 
would-be desisters a chance to imagine a new future (Farrall, 2005). The desire to be recognized (as 
µH[LVWLQJ¶RUDVKDYLQJFKDQJHGJHQHUDWHGFRQVWUDLQWV LQ WKH OLYHVRI WKHPHQ:HDYHU LQWHUYLHZHG
S EULQJLQJ D VHQVH RI µZH-QHVV¶ WR WKHLU OLYHV +HQFH WKH LQYHVWPHQWV GHVLVWHUV PDGH LQ
relationships drove them away from offending, as this became incompatible with these relationships 
(p104). As both Gadd and Weaver and McNeill note (following Farrall, 1995:56) many of these 
relationships are not with those working in the criminal justice system.  
This attention to the role of emotions in the desistance process is important, although desistance 
theories would benefit from closer attention to the emotions involved in the transition to ex-offender 
(as Healy, 2010 notes). Nevertheless, the above accounts imply that, as an emotional journey, the 
transition from offender to ex-offender is a positive one. Desistance from crime, or even the 
envisioning of an ex-offender identity, is invariably supposed to µfeel good¶. LeBel, et al (2008) and 
Giordano et al (2007) draw attention to the link between negative emotions and continued offending. 
For those attempting to desist, the expectation is that negative emotions will accompany any further 
offending.5  Conversely, maintaining the positive path that one is on is expected to feel good. We do 
not deny that this can be one part of the desistance experience (e.g. Farrall and Calverley, 2006; 
                                                          
5
 :HDFNQRZOHGJHWKDWRIIHQGLQJFDQEHµIXQ¶.DW]. However, when efforts are being made to stop offending, it 
seems plausible that feelings of satisfaction and pleasure will be derived from avoiding crime. 
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Farrall et al, 2014). However, when ex-offenders discuss the pride they feel at having desisted, talk 
about their satisfaction with their lives or the pleasure they derive from prosocial roles such as 
parenthood instead of activities based around offending (Farrall et al, 2014: Chapter 6), they  
frequently do so from a point in time quite far removed from their criminal activity. As such, these 
accounts are retrospective, often reported when desistance has been secured. In as much as desistance 
from crime represents a transition from one self to another and the establishing of a different set of 
desires, priorities and preferences, we do not expect that transition to be straightforward or easy. On 
the contrary, copious evidence suggests it is not, characterized instead by frequent backsliding, such 
WKDW HYHQ WUDMHFWRULHV WKDW HQG LQ GHVLVWDQFH IURP FULPH DUH EHVW GHVFULEHG E\ D µ]LJ ]DJ¶ DV
individuals have crime free periods punctuated by offending (Baker, Metcalfe and Piquero, 2014; 
Carlsson, 2013; and Metcalfe and Baker, 2015). This being the case, it is necessary to consider when 
the positive feelings associated with avoiding offending occur and, more specifically, whether 
avoiding offending feels good at the time.  
In sum then, while existing work has much to say about the operation of future selves and the role of 
emotions in the desistance process, there has been little investigation of how these aspects of the 
desistance process play out when opportunities to offend present themselves. We attempt to work 
towards rectifying this by considering the accounts of a group of offenders of specific moments when 
they came close to offending, but ultimately abstained. Our aim is to develop our understanding of 
the ways in which µdecisions¶not to commit particular offences are realised. In so doing, we locate 
our analysis within one model of how and why people stop offending. This model attempts to take 
account of the different factors that operate on offenders or provide the context for their lives (and 
hence their efforts to desist). The model is explained in detail elsewhere (Farrall et al, 2014:43-48). 
Our concern here is with what Farrall et al identify as µVLWXDWLRQDO FRQWH[WV¶ 7KHVH DUH VSHFLILF
PRPHQWV FLUFXPVWDQFHV DQG HYHQWV LQ SHRSOH¶V OLYHV DQG WKH UHODWLYH ZHLJKW SXW RQ WKHP DV WKH\
relate to efforts to desist from crime. These contexts can be defined in broad terms, such as the 
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context provided by a particular relationship, place of living or employment situation. Equally 
though, they may defined narrowly, with context provided by a micro level interactions. It is this 
latter conception of situational context that we focus on here. Specifically, the situational context of 
an identified opportunity to offend. 
We draw upon a qualitative data set to explore these contexts. We ask; What did our sample 
experience when they had opportunities to offend but did not?; Why did they refrain from 
offending?; and how did abstaining from offending feel to them (both at the time and when 
interviewed)? 7KHVHDUH WKH µLQQHUZRUNLQJV¶RI WKH situational contexts referred to by Farrall et al 
2014. These are (amongst other things) the specific situations in which people find themselves and 
are required to make moral choices and take action.  
 
METHOD 
The data we employ are drawn from a 15-year qualitative longitudinal study of desistance (see Farrall 
et al 2014 for a full description of the study). In 1997/8, 199 offenders were interviewed while 
serving a probation order in England and subsequently re-interviewed between one to four times. The 
most recent interviews were undertaken during 2010-2012. The sample members had been convicted 
of commonplace offences, with theft/handling, violent and drug offences featuring prominently in 
their accounts. We asked interviewees about their lives, their offending and the impact of their 
probation orders on their efforts to desist. Of importance for our purposes here, interviewees were 
asked to describe moments when they could have offended but refrained from doing so, with other 
questions designed to explore why they abstained and how abstaining felt both at the time and 
subsequently. Below we present data from the most recent sweep of fieldwork, at which 105 of the 
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original sample were traced and interviewed.6 Of these, 54 of our interviewees identified situations 
when they identified an opportunity to offend but abstained from offending, while 30 said they had 
not had such an opportunity.7 The analysis focused on identifying both the commonalities and 
GLIIHUHQFHVDFURVVRXULQWHUYLHZHHV¶DFFRXQWV 
The data represent a rich source of accounts on offending and desistance from crime. Nevertheless, 
we note that they are not without problems. Our interviewees were sometimes recalling incidents that 
were several years prior to the interview, with all the attendant issues of memory concomitant with 
this. It is possible therefore that their recollections of their reasons for abstaining represent an after 
WKH IDFW QDUUDWLYH UHFRQVWUXFWLRQ RI WKHLU DFWLRQV UDWKHU WKDQ WKHLU µWUXH¶ DFFRXQW 0DUXQD 
Although this is possible, we see little easy way to overcome this given the nature of our 
investigation and the focus of our enquiry. We cannot ask offenders about their efforts to abstain as 
they are making them, so some delay between incident and recall is inevitable. Notwithstanding this, 
ZH KRSH WKDW WKLV SRWHQWLDO GLIILFXOW\ ZLWK SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ UHFDOO PLJKW EH PLWLJDWHG WKURXJK DVNLQJ
participants to focus on specific situations, rather than recalling criminal opportunities in general. 
Below, we first identify some examples of situations interviewees described before considering why 
they did not take these opportunities to offend. We then discuss the uncertain and often negative 
feelings elicited by abstaining. Finally, we bring in those of our sample who had not identified 
opportuniWLHV WR RIIHQG DQG FRQVLGHU RXU SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ SURJUHVV WRZDUGV GHVLVWDQFH DV D PHDQV RI
explaining the differences in recognition of opportunities to offend.  
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 At sweep five, we were able to maintain a sample that was still broadly representative of the sample originally drawn in 
1997/98. See Farrall et al 2014: 90.  
7
 The remaining 21 were not asked the question. This was normally due to time constraints placed upon the interview, 
such as when an interview was conducted in prison.  
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FUTURE SELVES AND ABSTENTION 
We concern ourselves first with the 54 sample members who had identified opportunities to offend 
but abstained from taking them. These interviewees all wanted to desist from crime at the time they 
could have offended, in keeping with observations that even persistent offenders do not hold an 
µoffender¶ identity (Shapland and Bottoms, 2011). Their accounts therefore suggested that all were 
trying to refrain from offending, and indeed it appears many had subsequently desisted from crime. 
Nevertheless, they were readily able to recall and recount moments when they had identified an 
opportunity to offend but not acted upon it. The responses below were typical: 
 
Christian:  I remember at least on one occasion [uncle] did come here and he bought some 
stolen stuff with him, and I said to him, ³,W¶Vnot staying in this place´. 
Harry: 7KHUH¶VEHHQDFRXSOHRIWLPHVLQWKHSDVWOLNHWZR\HDUVOLNHWKHER\VDVNHG
me if I would go and pick some [stolen goods] up for them, DQGLW¶VOLNH³No, 
,ZRQ¶WGRWKDW´. 
Tom:  There were some lads wanting me to take some phones out fraudulently out of 
a phone shop. . . And they said ³:H¶YHgot a credit card here but it¶s´, they 
were two Asian lads, they said ³LW¶VLQDZKLWHPDQ¶VQDPH´DQGWKH\¶YHVHHQ
me, [and they have said] ³Can \RXJRLQDQGJHWSKRQHV"´[And I replied] ³1R
\RX¶UHDOULJKW´ 
 
Interviewees could recall incidents several years after they had happened. For example, Tom 
estimated that his experience occurred four or five years ago. Of perhaps more interest were the 
reasons our sample gave for not participating in offending. When asked why they did not offend, two 
themes emerged.  
 13 
µTOO MUCH TO LOSE¶ OR µ-867NOT WORTH IT¶? 
The notion of their µfuture self¶ is notable in the accounts our interviewees gave of their reasons for 
abstaining. Two broad themes (not necessarily mutually exclusive) stood out; some felt that they had 
moved so far on from when they had been offending that they now had too much to lose by re-
offending. Others, despite the fact that they had not yet developed a clear sense of what they wanted 
IRUWKHLUIXWXUHVQHYHUWKHOHVVIHOWWKDWWKHULVNVZHUHµQRWZRUWKLW¶When asked why they refrained 
from offending, eleven interviewees identified the aspects of their lives that would be put in jeopardy 
if they were to take opportunities to offend. Consider the following: 
 
Will:  [I was thinking] ,GRQ¶WZDQWWRORVHP\IODWDQGP\EXVLQHVVDQGP\GDXJKWHU 
Dylan:  ,¶YHJRWWRRPXFKWRORVH*RWZD\WRRPXFKWRORVH,¶YHJRWP\PLVVXVJRWP\NLGs. 
,¶YHMXVWJRWWRRPXFK... 
 
These concerns speak to particular goals that offenders held (see Gadd and Farrall, 2004:148 on 
defenses against pain, loneliness, fear etc.). The maintenance of the positive directions that they had 
established for themselves and the preservation of valued relationships and resources was paramount 
for some at particular moments when offending opportunities presented themselves. Such a focus 
speaks to particular aspects of the self that offenders valued and to this extent also had a forward-
looking element to them, inasmuch as our interviewees feared losing these things in the future. The 
assets they referenced speak to the particular roles they envisioned for themselves (as successful 
business owner, partner and parent). We think it relevant though that all were referring to positives 
that they had achieved and that they subsequently feared losing, a point we return to below. In 
contrast to those quoted above, seven gave reasons for abstaining that were more concerned with 
avoiding the negative consequences that offending would attract. These offenders were less clear on 
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what they wanted for their future but, equally, were certain of what they wanted to avoid (Paternoster 
and Bushway, 2009). For example: 
 
Al:  0D\EHLW¶VWKHWKRXJKWWKDW,WKLQN,FDQ¶WEHDUVHGJRLQJWR, JRLQJWRFRXUWRU,FDQ¶WEHDUVHG
GRLQJPRUHFRPPXQLW\VHUYLFHRU« 
Don:  , PHDQ DFWXDOO\ ZKHQ >WKH SROLFH@ DFWXDOO\ FDWFK \RX LW¶V D ORW PRUH VFDU\ WKDQ WKH
consequences and going to prison.  
Steve:  «DQG,¶OOWKLQNWKDWSURSHUW\LVHPSW\EXWLVLWZRUWKLWLVLWZRUWKJRLQJWRSULVRQHUEHLQJ
banged up 24/7?  
 
These accounts are in keeping with the notion that repeated contact with the criminal justice system, 
experienced by many of our sample had, prompts an increasing weariness with punishment (Cusson 
and Pinnsonneault, 1986; Shover, 1996). The desire to avoid the negative consequences of offending 
manifests as particular disenchantment with the effort involved in crime, relative to the rewards one 
may receive. Once again though, we do not want to suggest that such a weighing of the costs and 
benefits of offending was explicit.  
Considering these two different explanations for avoiding offending, we are reminded of the rather 
fragile identities that offenders hold, particularly as this applies to who one may become and 
contextualized by a broad desire to stop offending. The transition to ex-offender is one that takes 
time, but the identification of valued goods that might be put at risk by an engagement with offending 
and the desire to preserve them suggests the understanding that they may be lost. Simultaneously, 
these can be invoked in order to provide the motivation not to offend. However, what is relevant in 
considering that some who abstained had µtoo much lose¶ is that the relationships and roles that 
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desisters come to value and feel are incompatible with further offending need to be invested in and 
built up over time (Gadd and Farrall, 2004); that is, they accrue in number, significance and value. 
Before this build up has occurred, UROHVVXFKDVµJRRG¶parent or business owner might be imagined, 
but the risk of losing them is negligible if little progress has been made towards their achievement, or 
if the commitment to them wanes. In such instances, it is perhaps easier for offenders to focus upon 
what they wish to avoid rather than maintaining what they have or focusing on what they want. 
Paternoster and Bushway, in their conceptualization of future selves in the desistance process, 
suggest that a feared self (i.e. who one wishes to avoid becoming) is a more powerful motivator for 
abstaining from offending when the process is in its infancy (2009:1116) 2XU LQWHUYLHZHHV¶
responses suggest the opposite may be true however; a feared self is more readily identified when 
one has something to lose. The role of the feared self here is that envisioning failing at a relationship 
or some other endeavor also means to envision who one has become; a failure. 
 
HOW DOES IT FEEL TO ABSTAIN? 
As we note above, there is implicit in much desistance research the notion that abstaining from 
offending should µfeel good¶. Offenders may find it difficult to avoid crime and criminal 
opportunities, but are rewarded when they do so by an increase in feelings of self-esteem that comes 
IURPGRLQJWKHµULJKWWKLQJ¶ or positive reactions from others. This in turn increases the chance that 
such abstinence will be repeated in the future, creating a virtuous cycle out of crime. This was the 
case for some of our interviewees, with twenty-four reporting that they were pleased that they had 
avoided succumbing to opportunities to offend, citing the positive feelings abstaining elicited.  
Others were more ambivalent about how abstaining from offending had felt, however. We focus in 
some detail on these more negative feelings because, as we note above, the virtue of not offending is 
supposedly that it is its own (emotional) reward. Forty-three (47%) of those asked reported that 
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avoiding offending was not necessarily a positive experience at the time&RQVLGHU'HUHN¶Vaccount 
of his decision not to steal some clothes from a shop:  
Int 2ND\VRWKHUH¶VDVLWXDWLRQZKHUH\RXFRXOGKDYHWDNHQWKHVWXIIEXW\RXGLGQ¶WKRZGLG\RX
feel about not doing it? 
Derek Er, mixed feelings. Good and bad. 
Int Okay, what were the bad feelings? 
Derek I could have got away with it, I had a nice little tiFNRQEXW,GLGQ¶WFR]my mum was there, 
so« 
Int So this was three weeks ago, but looking back how do you feel now about not having done it? 
Derek Honestly, I feel like going back up there. Before Christmas, I keep WKLQNLQJ%XW,¶PQRW
Coz I want Christmas out with my mum. 
 
'HUHN¶V GHFLVLRQ ZDV VRPHWKLQJ KH NHSW UHWXUQLQJ WR LQ KLV PLQG µ, NHHS WKLQNLQJ «¶ DQG GRHV
sound like it was something which he deliberated on, choosing in the end that Christmas with his 
mother was more important to him (see Gadd and Farrall, 2004:130-1 on identification, and Bottoms 
2006 on diachronic self-control). Similarly, Bernard was frustrated when he chose not to respond to a 
situation as he was used to doing: 
Bernard: My missus was getting some grief down the school off these other people down there, 
so went down there, sort of sorted it out, but that could of went the other way, do you 
know what I mean. . .before we would have steamed in and sorted it out, through 
violence or something like that, but [this time] it goes through different channels. 
6KH¶GJRWROLNHWKHKHDGPLVWUHVVRUVRPHWKLQJOLNHWKDWDQGVRUWLWRXWUHDOO\WKHZD\
WKDW\RXVKRXOGVRUWLWRXWUDWKHUWKDQJRLQJLQWKHUHIXOOVWHDPDKHDG« 
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 Int So instead of using violence then you went and... 
 Bernard Well sort of verbally sorted it out yeah. 
 Int Okay. And how did that feel, so the sorting it out through talking? 
 Bernard  7REHKRQHVWLWGLGQ¶WIHHOWKDWJRRG%HFDXVH,VRUWRIWKRXJKWWRP\VHOIWKDWWKH\
they deserved more than just a talking to. Cause my missus was, my missus was 
pregnant with little un actually at the time like, and she had a bad back and these, this 
woman, pair of women jumped out of the car and was threatening to hit my missus 
and that. ,GRQ¶WNQRZ,WKRXJKWUHDOO\WKH\Geserved a lot more than just a talking to. 
%XWP\PLVVXVZDVOLNHQRQRZH¶OOVRUWWKLVRXWVRUWLWRXWWKHSURSHUZD\$QGWKDW
MXVWLWZDVDORWFDOPHU:KHUHDVEHIRUH,ZRXOGQ¶WKDYHHYHQOLVWHQHGWRDQ\WKLQJ,
would have just flew in there and sorted it out, you know what I mean. 
 Int Yeah. So at the time it was perhaps a bit, it was fair to say, frustrating, having to deal 
with it... 
 Bernard Oh very yeah. . .But I never dealt with things like that before. I always dealt with 
them, boom, get in there, sort it out, stuff the consequences.  
 
John also reported frustration, when turning down an opportunity from a friend to participate in a 
robbery, and later to transport what John assumed were stolen goods: 
Int: So how do you feel about having not done it, as it were, I mean how did it feel to 
phone that bloke up or to see him and say... 
John I felt shit, I felt like I was letting a mate down in a way. I must have said µ6orry¶ to 
him about 10 times. I felt a bit shit cause I felt like I was letting a mate down. And 
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WKHQLWZDVOLNHWKHIDFWRIZHOOGRWKH\WKLQN,¶PDQREKHDGFDXVH,¶PQRWGRLQJLW"
But I think more than anything I felt shit cause I was letting a mate down. 
 
Burnett highlights that a state of ambivalence characterizes the accounts of many property offenders 
who were trying to desist (2004). Ambivalence represented neither a wholesale rejection of 
RIIHQGLQJQRUDFRPSOHWHDGRSWLRQRIµFRQYHQWLRQDO¶YDOXHVEXWUDWKHUYDFLOODWLRQEHWZHHQWKHWZR; 
the push and pull and of goals that are incompatible with one another (Burnett, 2004:168). We 
LGHQWLI\VRPHHOHPHQWVRIWKLVDPELYDOHQFHLQRXURIIHQGHUV¶DFFRXQWV'HUHNFOHDUO\VWUXJJOHGZLWK
his competing emotions over his decision to abstain, and did so for several weeks after the incident. 
While identifying the positive aspects of not offending (spending Christmas with his mother) he 
recognized what he was giving up in order to refrain from an easy opportunity.  
In Bernard we see not ambivalence towards abstaining so much as feelings of discomfort, particularly 
µLQ WKHPRPHQW¶%HUQDUG¶V IUXVWUDWLRQDWQRW UHVRUWLQJ WRYLROHQFHZDVJURXQGHG LQKLVDWWHPSWV WR
learn a new way to resolve difficult situations and avoid offending, thereby realizing a particular 
future self he had identified. We also note the challenge to his self-FRQFHSWDVDPDQZKRµQHHGHG¶WR
protect his pregnant partner (see Graham and Wells, 2003:556 on the link between violence and 
µPDFKR¶ YDOXHV. Bernard was therefore still torn between the way he was used to dealing with 
difficult situations and his desire to avoid trouble. Indeed, during the interview, more than three years 
after the incident, Bernard was still unsure that avoiding violence had been right, noting equivocally 
WKDWLWZDV³...probably the best thing to do...´ 
For John, saying ³no´ OHIWKLPIHHOLQJ³OLNHVKLW´EHFDXVH LWFKDOOHQJHGKLVRZQVHOI-conception of 
what a good friend should do (render assistance when it is requested). This ambivalence and the 
negative feelings abstaining elicited can be located within efforts to achieve different future selves. 
These accounts therefore emphasize the competing urges within those who are trying to desist. Derek 
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was conflicted, wanting to resort to an established behavior that he knew well and understood he 
could benefit from, and attempting to realize the sort of person he wanted to be. For Bernard and 
John, not taking criminal opportunities was at odds with their self-concept and established patterns of 
behavior. What we think most noteworthy here is that refraining from offending was not a positive 
experience. Saying no to opportunities, especially when the benefits to be gained by doing so were 
perhaps not immediately obvious, IHOWµEDG¶1HYHUWKHOHVVZHQRWHWKHLUDELlity to delay (or perhaps 
more accurately, give up altogether) gratification for the promise of a particular future self. These 
observations are important because they remind us that, although we might hold a particular future 
self in mind, our emotions can challenge this particular project (Halsey, Armstrong and Wright, 
2016).  
 
FUTURE SELVES, EMOTIONS, AND THE PROGRESSION OF THE DESISTANCE PROCESS 
To this point we have said nothing of those in our sample (n=30) who reported that they had not 
encountered situations where they could have offended. We bring them in at this point to understand 
the difference between the accounts in our sample and to advance an understanding of how 
abstaining from offending might sit within a broader process of desistance.  
Above, we argue that the idea of who one might become can encourage abstinence from offending in 
specific circumstances (a key aspect of desistance over a longer period). Equally, desire to avoid the 
negative consequences associated with arrest were found for other interviewees. We have also argued 
that abstaining from offending, frequently fails to be a positive experience. In seeking to understand 
these observations we follow examples of earlier work (Farrall and Calverley, 2006; Farrall et al, 
2014) which has attempted to identify progression towards desistance, while avoiding a  
desister/persister dichotomy to identify how far along the path to desistance individuals were. This 
led us to identify those of our sample who were still offending (the persisters) and then separating 
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WKRVHZKRZHUHPDNLQJHIIRUWVWRGHVLVWDVHLWKHUµHDUO\¶RUµHVWDEOLVKHG¶GHVLVWHUV,GHQWLI\LQJZKHQ
desistance has occurred is notoriously difficult to accomplish (Laub and Sampson, 2001). 
Notwithstanding this, ZHGUHZXSRQRXUVDPSOH¶VGHVFULSWLRQVRI WKHLUHIIRUWVWRGHVLVWIURPFULPH
WHLGHQWLILHGDVµHDUO\¶GHVLVWHUVWKRVHZKRfelt they had made progress in desisting, but who were 
still rather uncertain in their attempts and unsure about how successful they would ultimately be. In 
this group were those whose last conviction was quite recent (although none had offended in the last 
six months), but also those who had managed a more sustained period of time without offending, 
DOEHLWIROORZLQJSHULRGVRIIUHTXHQWFULPLQDODFWLYLW\7KHµHVWDEOLVKHG¶GHVLVWHUVZHUHWKRVHZKRwe 
wHUHFRQILGHQWWKH\KDGµWXUQHGDFRUQHU¶RQWKHLURIIHQGLQJDQGFRXOGFLWHVLJQLILFDQWSHULRGVRIWLPH
that were free of criminal activity. Ultimately, the distinction between early and established desisters 
was not governed by the length of time individuals had avoided offending, although this did play a 
part. Instead it was a distinction based on how interviewees talked about their lives, their efforts to 
leave crime behind and their success in this endeavor. This distinction left us with three groups of 
interviewees: 20 persisters, 28 early desisters and 36 established desisters.  
Approaching our sample this way allows us to explore the observations we make above in more 
detail. Table 1 shows whether the persisters and the two groups of desisters we identify above had 
come close to offending but then abstained. While 16 of 20 (80%) of persisters and 23 of 28 (82%) of 
early desisters had come close to offending, only 42% of the established desisters had. 72% (39 of 
the 54) who had come close to offending were either persisters or early desisters. Conversely, 21 of 
the 30 (70%) who could not identify a time when they came close to offending were established 
desisters. 
[Table 1] 
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Table 1 suggests that established desisters were far less likely than either persisters or early desisters 
to have identified/recalled opportunities to offend. We argue that this indicates that as people desist 
from crime, they change their priorities and focus (see also Farrall et al, 2014: Chapter 6). What our 
data suggest is that a key part of this shift is that offenders become less likely to identify 
opportunities to commit crime. When attempts to desist are in their infancy, opportunities may be 
frequently spotted. Carl (an early desister) demonstrated his awareness of the occasions when he 
could have offended: 
³8PWKHRSSRUWXQLWLHVKDYHEHHQWKHUHWKH\DUHHYHU\GD\\RXZDONGRZQWKHURDGWKHUHLV
a person at the side, you could quite easily take [their possessions], charity boxes everywhere, 
you could quite easily take those,«´ 
Without asserting WKDW HYHU\RQH HQMR\V H[DFWO\ WKH VDPH RSSRUWXQLWLHV WR FRPPLW FULPH &DUO¶V
account reflects that the majority of people regularly encounter situations that present them with 
opportunities to offend. We are not in a position to adequately chart changes in frequency of 
opportunities or the types of crimes available to our sample. However, if criminal opportunities are 
indeed more or less ubiquitous, then what appears to distinguish our three groups is whether or not 
they identified them as such. In this regard, the early desisters are little different to the persisters, with 
the majority of each group spotting opportunities to offend, even if they did not take them. This 
suggests that there is a point in the desistance process at which individuals stop identifying 
opportunities to offend. It also suggests that, early on in the process, a conscious effort is required to 
avoid taking advantage of opportunities that are spotted, until such time as they are no longer 
recognized. Al, a persister, described his awareness of his environment and the opportunities it might 
provide for offending: 
³«even going into a shop to buy something, first thing I do look at all the staff, look at the 
floor and look for the cameras, I do it automaticallyLW¶VWKHILUVWWKLQJ,GRZKHQ,ZDONLQD
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shop, you know, walk down and I mean I know ± I know everything wLOO EH FDPHUD¶G LQ
[town], I know ± I know every ± LW¶V OLNH DQG HYHU\ VWRUH GHWHFWLYH , NQRZ HYHU\ VKRS
DVVLVWDQW,NQRZHYHU\VKRS,NQRZLWRIIE\KHDUW«´ (emphasis added) 
It is at this early point in the desistance process that a future self, employHGLQRUGHUWRJXLGHRQH¶V
actions and speak to who one wants to become, may be most pertinent (see also Healy, 2014). It is 
also at this point that an understanding of the consequences of further offending, whether expressed 
in terms of what one might lose or the attracting of further criminal justice sanctions, might be most 
keenly attended to. However, this formulation somewhat begs the question of what is responsible for 
this shift in awareness of opportuQLWLHV$OWKRXJKVXFKLVGLIILFXOWWRLGHQWLI\IURPRXULQWHUYLHZHHV¶
responses, we offer some suggestions.  
The first is that, as opportunities to offend are avoided, the benefits of desisting gradually become 
recognizable HYHQ LI DV LQ %HUQDUG¶V FDVH only grudgingly. For example offenders may witness 
their peers being apprehended, convicted or otherwise inconvenienced by criminal justice apparatus. 
Although we have focused here on the negative emotions that abstaining from offending might elicit, 
we also note that avoiding offending can make offenders feel good about themselves. Recognizing 
the benefits of a particular approach to avoiding offending increases the chance it may be employed 
again. As non-offending responses to situations become more frequently used they may become 
normalized and consequently the offending potential of situations is no longer recognized.  
A further possibility is that avoiding offending weakens criminogenic social networks that offenders 
have access to. CRQVLGHU -RKQ¶V concern about letting his friends down by refusing to offend with 
WKHP ,I -RKQ¶V Iriends did indeed feel let down this may decrease the chance that John will be 
invited to participate in future criminal activity. 7KLVLQWXUQPD\VHUYHWRDLG-RKQ¶Vcommitment to a 
pro-social future self. 7KLVH[DPSOHDOVRKLJKOLJKWV WKHLQWHUSOD\RI-RKQ¶VDJHQF\ZLWKLQWKHZLGHU
structural apparatus of his life. 
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Although we cannot be certain how it occurs, what the above indicates is that once offenders have 
progressed to a certain point in their desistance they no longer recognize offending opportunities. At 
this point, a non-offending future self is therefore of limited use, because it cannot be invoked to 
avoid an opportunity that is not recognized. Indeed, once desistance is firmly established the future 
self that is identified may be focused around more positive goals than simply not being an offender.  
 
CONCLUSIONS  
We have attempted to focus on the impact that a future, non-offending, self has on efforts to desist 
when opportunities for offending are presented, and also on the emotions that abstaining from 
offending elicited. Explanations for desistance frequently draw attention to the future aspects of 
RIIHQGHUV¶OLYHVDQGWKHnon-offending self they wish to become. These future selves are suggested as 
helping with desistance by providing a goal to be striven for and a guide to behavior. The accounts of 
our sample indicate that, for many, concerns about who they might become were foremost in their 
mind when opportunities to offend presented themselves. In citing worries over what might be lost if 
offending occurred, individuals commit themselves to certain futures and, in the process, certain 
selves. Paternoster and Bushway suggest that, when it comes to envisioning the future, who one fears 
becoming is a more powerful force for promoting pro social behavior than any desired self one might 
have (2009). We suggest additionally that fearing what one might lose is a more powerful 
motivational force for desistance the further one travels along the desistance path. This is perhaps 
because early in the desistance process (indeed, Paternoster and Bushway suggest this) there is little 
opportunity to conceive what may be achieved as a benefit of desistance, and that would be 
jeopardized by offending. This may go some way to accounting for what Halsey and colleagues refer 
WRDVµIXFNLW¶PRPHQWV, when efforts to desist are abandoned in the face of seemingly over-whelming 
odds (Halsey, et al 2016). :HFLWHG'HUHNIRUH[DPSOHZKRZDVFRQFHUQHGWRWDNHOLIH³RQHGD\DWD
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WLPH´EHFDXVHKHFRXOGQRWHQYLVLRQKRZHOVHWRSURFHHGZLWKKLVOLIH'HUHNVWLOOZDQWHGWRUHWXUQWR
the store and steal and he was not certain he would avoid doing so in the future. If repeatedly 
thwarted in his attempts to desist, Derek may abandon this project and offend again. Conversely, 
RQFH D QXPEHU RI µJRRGV¶ KDYH EHHQ DFFXPXODWHG HJ HPSOR\PHQW KDV EHHQ JDLQHG contact has 
been made with family members who were previously estranged) then it is easier to envision a feared 
VHOI7KHIHDUHGVHOIEHFRPHVµWKHRIIHQGHU¶RQFHWKHLQGLYLGXDOEHFRPHVIDUHQRXJKUHPRYHGIURP
their offending, and can be invoked in order to avoid losing what has been gained. We have also 
shown, however, that what characterizes the latter stages of the process of desistance is that, rather 
than opportunities for offending being resisted, they are not even identified. As such two types of 
feared self exist; who one might become if action is not taken (in line with Paternoster and Bushway, 
2009), and who one might return to if one does not avoid some actions.  
A general assumption in efforts to help offenders to desist from crime is that, quite apart from the 
benefits that might accrue to those who make efforts to desist, offenders are meant to avoid offending 
EHFDXVHLWLVWKHµULJKWWKLQJWRGR¶7he corollary of this is that avoiding offending should feel good 
in and of itself (Giordano, et al, 2007). The accounts we present here suggest this is perhaps a little 
unrealistic. Where offenders are involved in crime, or associate with those who are, abstaining can 
put them at odds with their prevailing self-concept. Their working self, that panoply of preferences, 
conceptions and understandings about who they are can be challenged (Paternoster and Bushway, 
2009). Few of our sample heOG DQ µRIIHQGHU¶ZRUNLQJ VHOIEXW, as John indicates above, refraining 
from offending can challenge other values or indeed working selves such as those based around 
KHOSLQJRQH¶V IULHQGV when asked. These experiences serve as an important reminder that at times 
emotions can be in conflict with particular identities and particular projects. To this extent, they can 
obstruct efforts to desist from crime by providing negative feedback relating to a specific course of 
action.  
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These observations allow for a greater understanding of desistance as a dynamic process. Before 
desistance is established, a conscious effort may be needed to avoid taking advantage of 
opportunities to offend (Paternoster (forthcoming) explores the importance of intentionality in efforts 
to desist). Eventually, the benefits of avoiding offending become apparent, such that offending risks 
jeopardizing valued goods that have been built up. There is an emotional component to this, however. 
7KDWDYRLGLQJRIIHQGLQJFDQIHHO µEDG¶KLJKOLJKWV WKH WUDQVLWLRQRI WKHZRXOG-EHGHVLVWHU¶V LGHQWLW\
where offending is not compatible with a future self, but where abstaining is at odds with the current, 
working self. In other words, the struggle for some who are trying to desist is that they know they 
should not be offending, but feel as though they should. Recall Bernard, who although unhappy that 
his situation had EHHQ GHDOW ZLWK ³YHUEDOO\´ UDWKHU WKDQ ZLWK YLROHQFH DOVR recognized that it was 
³«UHDOO\WKHZD\WKDW\RXVKRXOGVRUWLWRXW´  This emotional uncertainty requires us to consider in 
more detail how emotions inform processes of desistance. Emotions may provide impetus to avoid 
offending in some situations, perhaps particularly when the benefits of doing so, maintenance of 
valued relationships for example, are recognized. Conversely, and perhaps during the initial process 
of desistance, emotional impulses may have to be resisted if efforts to avoid offending are to be 
successful. Identifying at what point (or indeed if) emotions shift from being a hindrance to 
desistance to a help is an important part of unpacking this dynamic. 
Part of desisting from crime LVDERXWOHDUQLQJQHZZD\VWRµEH¶ and the development of a self able to 
manage potentially criminal situations without offending is part of this. As new competencies and 
expertise DUH GHYHORSHG WKHVH DUH DGGHG WR LQGLYLGXDOV¶ slowly evolving sense of self (Fontana, 
2002). The experiences that offenders have as they resist opportunities to offend and the emotions 
such resistance elicits help to solidify (or perhaps weaken) a desister identity as a desired future self. 
We think this conceptualization RI GHVLVWDQFH DQG WKH SRVVLELOLW\ RI µUHODSVH¶ LQ WKH SURFHVV EHWWHU
takes account of the difficulty of committing to a route away from crime. It suggests that not 
identifying opportunities to offend may be a consequence of desistance from crime rather than a 
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cause. To suggest the reverse would seem to indicate that the ability to identify opportunities is just 
µWXUQHGRII¶DW DFHUWDLQSRLQW WKLV UXQQLQJFRXQWHU WRZKDWZHNQRZRIGHVLVWDQFHDV DGUDZQRXW
process in which changes in identity happen gradually. Even engagement in the routine activities 
associated with prosocial changes that are associated with desistance (such as employment for 
example) does not preclude opportunities for offending. As Carl and Al attested, everyday situations 
such as walking down the street or going into a shop present numerous chances to commit crime if 
you are attuned to the possibility of them.  
Our work further suggests that we may be asking a great deal of offenders to just enjoy having 
stopped offending. Efforts to assist offenders with their desistance should perhaps do more to 
recognize the effort involved, the counter intuitive feelings that accompany abstaining from 
offending and the uncertainty that is part and parcel of not knowing if desistance from crime will ever 
be achieved. 3RVLWLYH HPRWLRQV PD\ DVVLVW RIIHQGHUV LQ WKHLU HIIRUWV WR µFURVV RYHU¶ LQWR SURVocial 
territory (Giordano, et al, 2007), but the accounts we present above suggest that avoiding offending 
can be a far more ambivalent, or even negative, experience. If avoiding offending does not even feel 
good (at least initially), then the benefits of doing so are likely to be much harder to identify. This 
actually emphasizes the importance of agency in the desistance process, in order to commit to not 
offending even when there may not be an obvious benefit to doing so.  
Farrall et al (2014) introduce a model of how people desist from crime, and suggest that opportunities 
to offend could be conceptualized DVµVLWXDWLRQDOFRQWH[WV¶WKDWare at play in processes of desistance. 
What then is the role of these contexts? First and foremost, situational contexts provide a testing 
ground for the viability of a non-offending future self. The contexts we have focused on here, 
particular moments when opportunities to offend were identified, might be best thought of as micro 
level tests of whether this self was achievable. Of course, situational contexts interact with other 
important contexts such as influence of policies or changes in values. No two situational contexts are 
likely to be the same, perhaps explaining why opportunities to offend may be taken at some times but 
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not others. This highlights the second point we wish to make about situational contexts for desisting: 
they relate to the other areas of the life in an iterative fashion. For example, an opportunity to offend 
that is not taken might reduce the chance of further opportunities (as we describe above for John), 
while changes in values and attitudes might mean that offending opportunities are not spotted as 
frequently, as we contend is the case for our established desisters. Finally, and notwithstanding our 
previous point, we note that situational contexts stand in isolation to the extent that, despite their 
pasts, offenders may choose in particular contexts to offend or not. They are, therefore, not wholly 
determined by what has come before. It might be that a future self is the mechanism by which 
offenders can transcend situations of significant disadvantage that might favor further offending, 
even if only briefly. This indicates the importance of agency in particular moments when offending 
might occur, and even given conditions otherwise characterized by disadvantage. It is vital, therefore, 
WKDWH[SODQDWLRQVRIGHVLVWDQFHGRQRWDWWHPSWDµRQHVL]HILWVDOO¶DSSURDFKWRDFFRXQWIRUURXWHVDZD\
from crime. For some offenders desistance may seem almost inevitable as they come under prosocial 
influences that lead them away from offending without much planning (Laub and Sampson, 2003). 
For others, conscious efforts are needed to recognize potential opportunities that might assist with 
desistance efforts and to take advantage of them (Paternoster and Bushway, 2014; Paternoster, 
unpublished). The resources that offenders have access to may mediate where they fall on this 
happenstance/agency continuum (Giordano, et al also make this point, 2002:1026), but the nature of 
the criminal career, not least the offences offenders are involved with, may also determine in part the 
way it is exited. 
Our goal here has been to advance a more nuanced account of the emotional dynamics of desistance. 
Paying attention to what happens in the moments when people refrain from offending helps us 
understand the often tentative early processes of desistance and the difficulties involved. We perhaps 
expect refraining from offending to feel good, ignoring the dissonance that abstaining may present 
for an identity that is in transition. These moments of desistance are important because they 
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demonstrate the ways that different perceptions of self preclude offending. They also, through a 
consideration of groups of offenders at different stages of the desistance process, illustrate the 
progression of desistance and the transition to an identity no longer predicated on avoiding offending, 
but instead focused more firmly on the future. 
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Table 1.  Persisters and desisters and whether they had ever come close to offending 
 Ever come close to offending?  
 Yes No Total 
Persisters 16 (80%) 4 (20%) 20 
Early desisters 23 (82%) 5 (18%) 28 
Established desisters 15 (42%) 21 (58%) 36 
 
   
Total 54 30 84 
 
